Comment: What is Palestine’s UN strategy?
Three ways in which Palestine's UN bid damages their own cause.
By Jonathan Cummings
The Palestinian bid for recognition at the UN this week is both good and original. Unfortunately, to misquote Dr Johnson, the part that is good is not original and the part that is original is not good.
There has probably never been a better time for the Palestinians to bid for independence. The changes sweeping the Arab world have brought new weight to the demand for democracy and freedom in the region. The Palestinian Authority's state-building efforts, so different from the Arafat-era armed struggle, make sense to international observers. Large parts of Israeli society are increasingly confident that their own interests are served by the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is no longer a sign of weakness to talk of Palestinian independence; for many Israelis it is the best hope for the future.
Yet, there is little new here. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) has been calling for national liberation for nearly half a century, and was recognised as the sole representatives of Palestinian rights nearly forty years ago. Israel recognised the PLO nearly twenty years ago in the Oslo accords, just as the PLO formally renounced violence. Israelis and Palestinians now largely agree on both the principle of two states, and on the outline of how an agreement would look in reality. When Likud leader and prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu gave his Bar-Ilan speech two years ago, he signalled that the two-state solution was now a consensus issue for Israelis. Not original, but none the worse for that.
More worryingly, what is new – the Palestinian decision to seek the support of the United Nations in their bid for independence – may not be very helpful in finding an end to the conflict. The Palestinians want to have their positions endorsed internationally, outside the context of agreement with Israel. This could make it harder to restart talks in the future in at least three ways, and erode the 'bottom-up' work of getting Palestine ready for independence.
Firstly, the upgraded UN status the Palestinians seek is not very different from the 'independent state with provisional borders' described in the second phase of the 2003 Quartet-sponsored Roadmap. Palestinians could have taken the offer then, and pursued a final status agreement within a strong international framework. But that offer passed them by perhaps for fear that what was provisional and temporary would become stuck as inconclusive negotiations dragged on. Those concerns would be just as valid now, but the Palestinians seem to be disregarding them this time.
Secondly, this new status might actually weaken the Palestinians just as they seek to wrap up negotiations with Israel on the toughest parts of a deal. In upgrading their international standing in representing the Palestinians of the West Bank and – perhaps – Gaza, they may weaken their ability to talk on behalf of the Palestinian refugee population. It is hard to see how this would be helpful in their pursuit of the claim of the right of refugee return to Israel, and hard to see how a comprehensive agreement could ignore the refugee issue. And, thirdly, if their new status gives the Palestinians standing in front of international tribunals, the chimerical pursuit of legal remedies could make the messy work of direct negotiations look even less attractive.
On the ground, the Palestinians may have even more to lose. Salam Fayyad's state-building programme has delivered a professional security force which has improved the standing of the PA on the streets, and is making a strong case that Israeli military presence is no longer necessary. Indeed, Israel has taken some steps to lighten the burden of occupation by removing roadblocks and easing movement and passage for Palestinians. The UN gambit is at best a diversion from this programme, the time that the Palestinian leadership has delivered real, sustained improvement to daily life for Palestinians. It could erode the international and Israeli trust in the PA, limiting further success. Worst of all, the failure of the UN bid could, contrary to all intentions, bring violence back to Israeli-Palestinian relations.
It may be too much to expect the negotiators in Turtle Bay to find an outcome that is both good and original at the same time. The best answer will combine some recognition of the Palestinians' right to independence without prejudging or limiting the negotiations which will inevitably have to follow. Not all good, not all original – but none the worse for it.
Jonathan Cummings is the Director of the Israel office of BICOM, the Britain Israel Communications and Research and Centre (www.bicom.org.uk). He writes in a personal capacity.
The opinions in politics.co.uk's Comment and Analysis section are those of the author and are no reflection of the views of the website or its owners.
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